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1. Introduction 
After the Three Mile Island accident, people have been showing a growing interest in 
human errors in the nuclear field. Human errors in nuclear power plants have been an 
important factor in the human factors researches. As a part of human factors practices, 
nuclear power plants are conducting safety assessments such as Periodic Safety Review 
(PSR) and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in order to reduce any possibility which 
might cause major accidents or damage. Especially, to reduce the human errors recently not 
only some efforts to eliminate human related causes have been attempted, but also a means 
to widely manage the human errors such as Human Factors Management Program (HFMP) 
has been developed. Therefore, this chapter concerns the properties of complex systems and 
addresses the various practices of human factors. 
Traditionally, approaches to reduce human errors were to classify error types and to 
protect operators from Performance Shaping Factor (PSF). Classification of human errors 
were conducted in previous studies and applied to find cause factors in various ways. 
These analyses of human errors were gradually systematized as a safety reporting system. 
Especially, short-term and long-term countermeasures were attempted to minimize 
possible human errors in a complex system such as aircraft, nuclear power plant. The 
purpose of these countermeasures is to reduce human errors and to improve performance 
of operators and systems at the same time. These countermeasures previously focused  
on satisfaction assessment of Man-Machine Interface (MMI), but these focused on broad 
considerations which are operator related such as safety culture, communication, aptitude 
test, etc. in recent. With regulation, the will of employer and the safety consciousness  
of operators are necessary to manage them efficiently. This chapter concerns various trials 
of reducing human errors and discusses requirements to perform an identification of 
them. 
2. Complex systems 
In general industry, insuring tranquility of individuals and systems is acknowledging a 
prerequisite because that is the first requirement to avoid accidents. Especially, accidents 
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in complex system do not simply lead to worker’s individual disaster or pecuniary 
damage, but create unexpected damage or develop managerial risks or social issues. 
Therefore, when safety requirements are not satisfied in complex systems, the issues can 
bring serious problems in not only individuals and managements but also a longer society 
(Lee, 2006).  
Process industry contributes to society by mass production based on cost-effectiveness 
through large system of high-reliability. However, if an accident occurs in this industry,  
it can be face with rejection rather than contribution because of a great deal of  
damage. 
Recently, various safety-related efforts are being focused on large systems from workplace 
management for preventing individual’s injuries to risk management for maintenance of 
systems, customer protection like Product Liability (PL) law, and preparing an expansion of 
social damage. 
Among these efforts, safety related hardware is improving rapidly with the high-level 
reliability, but safety insurances for preparing human errors are not satisfied relatively. 
Especially, because relative importance of human errors related to accidents increases in 
large systems of high-reliability, it is difficult to determine correctly a direction of effective 
prevention. So, if efforts of accident prevention are effective, we should be more careful of 
which precautions are premised on relatively important considerations related to human 
error. That is, even if process industry is a high-tech industry of high-reliability, if it has not 
enough reliability, it can face unexpected new dimension of social antipathy, in spite of the 
achievement of industrial effect and role.  
Therefore, we have to investigate items which consider improving the efforts for accident 
prevention in complex systems such as nuclear power plants. According to Lee’s study 
(2006), he examined ten empirical reviews related to human error in nuclear fields  
and suggested basic considerations that need to prevent accidents. These reviews  
are misunderstandings about human error and suggestions which be found by trial and 
error; 
1. Human error in an accident occurs by accident 
2. Human error can be captured by the statistics 
3. Human error is to blame to human 
4. Human error can be reduced by enforcements 
5. Human error can be reduced by voluntary efforts 
6. Human error never recurs to the same human 
7. Human error can be prevented by eliminating causes 
8. Performance also means safety 
9. The same cause, the same accident 
10. Keep the basic principles against human errors 
Also, according to the previous studies, accidents related to the complex system’s reliability 
have three major the properties as follows (Lee, 2003; Park et al., 2008); 
1. Dependency and inherence of an accident 
2. Representativeness and latency of an accident 
3. Chaining and structural properties of accidents 
Not only nuclear power plants but other various major industrial accidents have these 
properties. Thus, the properties as stated above have to be considered to improve safety in a 
procedure for an accident analysis. 
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3. Human factors practices in NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) 
In the following, we introduce human factors practices which include human factors 
assessment and management in NPPs.  
3.1 PSR 
PSRs were adopted in order to guarantee the continued safe operation of nuclear power 
plants. PSRs are focused on considering various aging effects and are generally conducted 
approximately every ten years, and for this, analysis procedures are required such as an 
inspection, structure analysis, failure assessment and a combination of them (IAEA, 2010; 
Ko et al., 2006). 
Through PSRs in Korean NPPs, the status of various human factors in operating NPPs has 
been reviewed by human factors experts and independent operation experts. Many points 
that are not suitable in a human factors sense have been revealed and remedies for these 
have also been discussed between the reviewers and plant personnel (Lee et al., 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c; Lee et al., 2006a, 2006b). 
In the process of PSRs, two different types of responses from plant personnel have been 
identified. One is to encourage our reviews and admit the findings as valuable information 
for upgrading human factors in their plant. Another is to refuse to assist in the reviews and 
to insist that they do not have any human factors problems. 
We will describe here in detail about a PSR of human factors since we think that our PSR 
activities contribute considerably to an enhancement of the human factors in NPPs. 
Our PSR of human factors complies with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 
safety guide (IAEA, 2003). The following items are defined in the IAEA guide; 
a. Staffing levels for the operation of a nuclear power plant with due recognition of 
absences, shift working and overtime restrictions 
b. Availability of qualified staff on duty at all times 
c. Policy to maintain the know-how of the plant staff 
d. Systematic and validated staff selection methods (e.g. testing for aptitude, knowledge 
and skills) 
e. Programs for initial training, refresher training and upgrading training, including the 
use of simulators  
f. Training in safety culture, particularly for management staff 
g. Programs for the feedback of operating experience for failures and/or errors in human 
performances that have contributed to safety significant events and of their causes and 
corrective actions and/or safety improvements 
h. Fitness for duty guidelines relating to hours of work, good health and substance 
abuse 
i. Competence requirements for operating, maintenance, technical and managerial staff 
j. Human-machine interface: design of the control room and other work stations; analysis 
of human information requirements and task workload; linkage to PSA and 
deterministic analyses  
k. Style and clarity of procedures. 
These broad areas were grouped into five categories; (1) procedures, (2) Human Machine 
Interface (HMI), (3) human resources, (4) human information requirements and workload, 
and (5) use of experience. The relationship between the five areas and the IAEA assessment 
items is shown in Table 1. 
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Our assessment areas Items defined in IAEA safety guide 
(1) Procedures (k)
(2) HMI (j)
(3) Human resources
(4) human information requirements and workload
(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (i) 
(5) Use of experience :
incorporated into (1), (2), and (3)
(g) 
Table 1. Relations between our assessment area and the PSR items defined in IAEA safety 
guide (IAEA, 2003) 
For the five assessment areas, the details of these assessments are described as following. 
 
1. Procedures 
Class Detail
a. Check 
Points 
 The availability of the procedures; to evaluate if the plant provides procedures 
that explicitly identify the tasks related to plant safety 
 The appropriateness of the style and structure; to assure that procedures do not 
result in an excessive load to operators and cause them to become confused 
during their task performance 
 The suitability of the detailed elements; to evaluate if the structure and properties 
of the procedures satisfy the requirements in NUREG-0899, NUREG-1358, 
NUREG/CR-1999, other relevant NRC documents, IAEA TECDOC-1058, and 
various plant procedure management and guideline documents
b. Methods 
 Procedural document reviews 
 Interviews with plant personnel 
 On-site reviews 
 Expert panel reviews
c. Scope 
 Operation procedures: EOPs (emergency operation procedures), GOPs (general 
operation procedures), SOPs (system operation procedures), AOPs (abnormal 
operation procedures), and alarm procedures  
 Many departmental procedures 
Table 2. Procedures assessment 
 
2. HMI 
Class Detail 
a. Check 
Points 
 The availability of HMI; to evaluate if all HMI elements are provided as required 
for a performance of the tasks. Comparison between a list of HMI elements made 
from the analyses of the operation procedures and operator interviews and the list 
of HMI elements on the control boards 
 The suitability of HMI; to verify if the HMI properties are suitable for human 
factors guidelines NUREG-0700 or NUREG-0700 Rev. 2 and KINS-G-001 chapter 
18. 
b. Methods 
 The effectiveness of HMI; to assure that HMI supports task performance so that 
operators can achieve the intended task objectives through the HMI. Experiments 
in a plant simulator were performed to evaluate the effectiveness of HMI 
 The suitability of the work environmental conditions; to check by measurement if 
illumination, noise, vibration, etc. on selected spots are within required limits 
c. Scope 
 MCRs (main control rooms), RSPs (remote shutdown panels), local control panels, 
SPDS (safety parameter display systems), and main computer systems 
Table 3. HMI assessment 
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3. Human Resource 
Class Detail
a. Check 
Points 
Work Management
 working hour management (e.g. adequate work hour, overtime) 
 shift management (e.g. rules of shift work, shift rotation schedule) 
  job substitute management (e.g. job substitute considering qualification, 
authority, and human factors) 
 work management during an O/H (overhaul) period 
Health Management 
 medical examination (e.g. epidemiology) 
 mental health and alcohol, substance abuse  
 health promotion activity (e.g. musculoskeletal disorders) 
 job satisfaction and devotion 
 health promotion activity 
 staff morale 
Recruit and Qualification 
 recruit (e.g. criteria for recruiting) 
 qualification and requirements for NPP personnel  
 maintaining a specialty of plant personnel  
Training Program 
 execution of SAT (Systematic Approach to Training)  
 assessment of instructors (academic career, job career)  
Safety Culture 
To check if the plants make an effort to enhance the awareness of plant safety through 
education; 
 plan and contents of safety culture education Operator Training using Simulators; 
To check if the plants provide adequate simulator training to operators for them to 
operate the plant safely and manage emergency state well; 
 training program for operators using simulators 
 suitability of simulators (e.g. facility status, maintenance and management status) 
b. Methods 
 document reviews
 structured interviews with plant personnel 
 on-site reviews 
 expert panel reviews
Table 4. Human resource assessment 
 
4. Human Information Requirements and Workloads 
Class Detail
a. Check 
Points 
To determine if explicit task information requirements are satisfied and if a job 
operation by a department, a plant person, and an individual task is appropriate 
b. Methods 
 selection and reviews of a total of 80 departmental procedures
 structured interviews with plant personnel 
 on-site reviews 
 expert panel reviews
c. Scope 
 mental workload related information requirements
 other factors related information requirements 
- personal requirements; expertness, experience, job characteristics, levels 
of knowledge 
- organizational requirements (among individuals or departments) ; work 
orders, training and education factors 
 environmental factors related information requirements (e.g. illumination, noise, 
vibration) 
 Workload (e.g. objective and subjective workload, physiological workload) 
Table 5. Human information requirements and workloads assessment 
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5. Use of Experience 
Class Detail 
a.  Check 
Points 
To review various operational experiences and to incorporate the findings of the 
above elements into human factors 
b. Scope 
 the issues and recommendations raised by the regulatory body 
 operation and maintenance experience 
 trip and event reports 
 human error reports 
 minor deficiency reports, 
 the implementation of the TMI action plan 
 FSAR changes 
Table 6. Assessment for use of experience  
Conclusively, reviews of human factors in NPPs by external experts have revealed many 
human factor problems which have remained hidden. Through PSRs, practical methods to 
assess the factors other than HMIs and the procedures have been established. 
3.2 HFMP (Human Factors Management Program) 
From the results of our PSRs, it has been found that human factors in NPPs need to be 
managed continuously by an organization inside the plant. For this reason, we are 
developing a prototype of the HFMP. We introduce the HFMP here as a proposition for a 
human error management in NPPs. 
It will have a top level general human factors management procedure document, and detail 
documents for practice procedures, checklists, and technical criteria. The top level 
procedural document contains a general procedure and other information such as purpose, 
scope of application, references, definition, responsibility, and basic articles including the 
organization, committee, training and education for the operation of the HFMP. Plant 
personnel who are exclusively in charge of human factors are newly assigned and a 
committee for the HFMP operation is formed in the plant. General HFMP procedure has the 
form of a Plan-Do-Check or Study-Act which is a basic process in a BPM (business process 
management). It describes procedures for planning, execution and operation, assessments, 
reviews by the HFMP committee and decision making. Attachments of detailed procedures 
are provided for the management of individual human factors such as plant procedures, 
work management, qualification, training and education, workload management, HMI, and 
human error management. These items are considered in the HFMP based on the 
requirements for a PSR of human factors in NPPs. HFMP will have a complete form this 
year and many discussions with plant personnel and many cases of a real application will be 
attempted to establish the system. Figure 1 shows a structure of documents which include 
procedures and guides for HFMP.  
4. Human error analysis 
4.1 Human error taxonomy 
When designing installations for safety-related complex systems it is important to be able to 
analyse the effect of human errors on essential tasks. For this reason the sensitivity and 
reliability of these systems to errors must be judged from some kind of EMEA (Error Mode 
and Effect Analysis) based on a classification of types of human error. To be useful also for 
adopting new technology in the HMI, taxonomy through psychological mechanisms is 
www.intechopen.com
 The Human Factors Approaches to Reduce Human Errors in Nuclear Power Plants 383 
necessary rather than taxonomy derived from behaviouristic classification (Rasmussen, 
1988). However, there is no generally approved and used taxonomy for human errors. 
Taxonomy for human errors is just made for specific purpose. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Construction of HFMP 
Swain (1982) suggested task-based taxonomies which state what happened. These 
taxonomies of human errors are classified as either error of commission or error of omission. 
Error of omission is defined as slip or lapse in performing a task, while error of commission 
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is defined as erroneous action while executing a task. Many studies of human error 
taxonomy focused on symbolic processing models. These approaches are more cognitive in 
their direction, and consider the human as having reference mental models and how things 
work, and how to perform. Rasmussen (1982) suggested SRK model. Reason (1990) 
suggested 4 types of error modes slips, lapses, mistakes and violations. Hollnagel (1993; 
1996) suggested Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) which based on 
a set of principles for cognitive modelling, Simple Model of Cognition (SMoC), Contextual 
Control Model (COCOM).  
4.2 IAD (Industrial Accident Dynamics) 
The dependency and the potentiality of the hazards in a NPP are defined by estimating the 
relative factors of the events using the IAD diagram as shown in Figure 2. 
IAD matrix has usually been applied to the industrial safety domain. This technique is 
arranged as seven accident occurrence stages (background factors, background and 
initiating factors, initiating factors, intermediate factors, immediate factors, near accident, 
and accident) and two management stages (measurable results and countermeasures) for 
the column of a matrix. A row consists of four general classes: (1) machine, material and 
object of work, (2) human, (3) environment, and (4) others (management, supervision, 
education, etc.). In nuclear field study, these factors were modified to make the best use of 
the Frank Bird’s accident theory (lack of control, fundamental factors, immediate factors, 
accident and injury) for ensuring an easiness of analyses. And finally, the IAD matrix 
consisted of the managerial and influencing factors, the fundamental causes and factors, 
unsafe conditions, unsafe actions, accident inducing factors, and the result and loss, as well 
as the 4M (Lee et al., 2007; Hwang et al., 2007; Hwang et al., 2008). 
4.3 HPES 
Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) developed originally by INPO has 
been used in many countries, including Korea. In the case of our country, the Korean 
utility company modified the original HPES to become K-HPES similar to the J-HPES in 
Japan, which is a Japanese version of HPES and was developed by the Central Research 
Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI). The development and application of K-
HPES was led by the top management of the Korean utility company in the early 1990s. 
The top management compelled plant personnel to generate K-HPES reports to the pre-
assigned number of cases during the early years of its application. This enforcement 
hindered the advantages of voluntary reporting and brought about adverse effects in the 
use of the system. Workers felt stress by this reporting assignment, additional to their 
normal work, and sometimes reported artificial data, and hesitated to use the reports in 
their work practice. 
Another feature of the initial version of K-HPES that caused its failure was the difficulty of 
plant personnel to produce a report by using K-HPES. It used many cognitive terms that are 
not understandable to plant personnel and required a high level of skill in the analysis of 
human error cases.  
Many revisions have been performed. The system has become more simple and a web-based 
version has been developed (Jung et al., 2006). Also the compulsive attitude of management 
in the operation of K-HPES was mitigated. An analysis and report generation can be done 
with the web-based K-HPES. New K-HPES without the disadvantages that the initial 
version had may help plant personnel to reduce the number of human errors. 
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Fig. 2. Hazard factors using the IAD diagram – case study 
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5. Countermeasures of reducing human error in Korea 
During the period 2004 to 2005, the Nuclear Safety Commission has suggest the importance 
of short and long term countermeasure as trip events of NPPs by human error has grown in 
Korea (KINS, 2006). Thereby, as part of countermeasure of reducing human error, human 
factors and nuclear power experts established a basic plan for reducing human error. These 
long-term countermeasures, the three directions and ten practical tasks have been selected 
and promoted. Also, experts suggested implementation plan for reducing human errors 
based on these practical tasks (Table 7). 
 
Plan Main execution items 
Development of system and program for 
individual job analysis 
- Management of individual job list of departments 
- Personality/aptitude tests and psychology tests 
- Establishment of job fitness 
Task analysis of procedures related in safety 
- A state-of-the-art review of task analysis methods 
- Development of task analysis methods 
Improvement of method for EOP (Emergency 
Operating Procedure) presentation 
 
Grasp and improve communication types 
- Analysis communication types among operators 
- Analysis communication types between operator 
and local 
- Analysis communication types between operator 
and support group 
- Improvement of communication channel and 
offer of communication tool 
Development of teamwork enhancement 
technique 
- Development of teamwork enhancement 
technique and reflection to training 
- Development of teamwork enhancement index 
Simulator construction and application using web 
virtual technology 
 
Korea human error program development based 
on behaviour 
- FMS (Fundamental Monitoring System), 
examination, human error tracking 
- Compensation for behaviour 
Human factors assessment support 
- MCR environment assessment 
- Human factors review support of automatic 
facility 
Job support system development using mobile  
Table 7. Implementation plan suggested by experts group 
Recently, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is developing several 
technologies for human error reduction and suggests plans as countermeasure. The 
following sections are main activities or assessment for human factors management (Lee et 
al., 2011).  
5.1 A suitability evaluation for human resources 
A suitability assessment of department assignment intends to prevent human errors 
through job assignment considering employees’ ability. Also, a purpose of this assessment is 
establishing an effective suitability assessment and developing an application plan in Korea 
NPPs. KAERI utilize the Organizational Personality Type Indicator (OPTI) which is 
developed to identify relationship with validity, immersion and satisfaction, based on 
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relationship and propensity correlation between personality types of individual and 
organization in organization diagnosis, development, personnel administration and 
psychology (O'Reilly et al., 1991; Yoo, 1999). Especially, the assessment guaranteed 
applicative possibility in business for a suitability assessment of department assignment 
through analyzing factors needed preliminary application after investigating relationship 
among propensities of organization, team administrator and individual. 
5.2 A development of job suitability criteria 
A Fitness for Duty (FFD), decision criteria of job suitability in human factors aspects, is 
developed to prevent human errors related in job of employee and improve job efficiency. 
The FFD derived factors which are necessary to manage human resources of employees in 
Korea NPPs using analysis for 10CFR26 (U.S. standard), ILO standard, employee 
characteristic and present state of suitability management. The reduced management factors 
are health diagnosis, mental health, drug management, job stress management, behavior 
observation, fatigue management, employee support and so on.  
5.3 A human error analysis method for digital devices 
In order to introduce advanced digital devices, KAERI analyzed types of human errors 
which occur on processes when user of digital devices use and developed plans which 
evaluate occasion possibility. Even if the digital devices are the same controller, the 
properties of devices can differ with the results through control methods. So, considering 
this point of view, they defined the Interaction Segment (IS) and the Error Segment (ES) 
which combined external physical units and control methods, and derived the types of 
human errors which are possible to rise up superposition of ES. If developed assessment 
applies job analysis, we can derive possible types of human errors and risk factors every 
types. 
5.4 A communication analysis 
Communication can help to harmonize job performance of employees in NPPs, but the 
communication can become causes of creating human errors as well as means of preventing 
human errors. Therefore, various studies which related in communication protocol and 
types between employees and interaction types with interface facilities are necessary in 
order to analyze communication types and improve communication tools. Especially, these 
studies can help to prevent hazard of human errors caused by communication. 
5.5 Human error reduction campaign posters 
The Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) bench marked the excellent foreign nuclear 
power plants and introduced human error prevention tools. The KHNP produced 40 posters 
for human performance improvement as shown in figure 3. The preceding posters which 
KHNP developed in 2006 give a message about specific information related to human errors 
events. However it is not enough to arouse interest in the effectiveness of posters because 
most people are favorably disposed toward a simple poster which has much of illustration. 
Therefore, KAERI developed new types of 30 posters for human error tools as shown in 
figure 4 (Lee, 2009). The developed posters illustrated the HE precursors to express 
effectively the primary intention and to make up for discrepancies in the current posters. 
The error precursors listed in table 8 were compiled from a study of the INPO’s event 
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database as well as reputable sources on human performance, ergonomics, and human 
factors (INPO, 2002). These posters put the accent on worker’s receptiveness than 
notification of information and lay also emphasis on visual characteristics. 
Except for these technologies, the others propel various methods for reducing human 
errors. These contain a teamwork evaluation of Main Control Room (MCR) crews, a 
behavior based safety program, an enhancement of the procedures and a human error 
hazard analysis. 
 
Category HE precursors 
Task Demands 
Time pressure, High workload, Simultaneous tasks, Repetitive actions, Irrecoverable 
acts, Interpretation requirements, Unclear goals & responsibilities, Unclear standards 
Work 
Environment 
Distractions/Interruptions, Changes/Departure from routine, Confusing displays, 
Work-arounds instrumentation, Hidden system response, Unexpected equipment 
condition, Lack of alternative indication, Personality conflict 
Individual 
Capabilities 
Unfamiliarity with task, Lack of knowledge, New technique not used before, 
Imprecise communication habits, Lack of proficiency, Indistinct problem-solving 
skills, “Unsafe” attitude for critical tasks 
Human Nature 
Stress, Habit patterns, Assumptions, Complacency, Mind-set, Inaccurate risk 
perception, Mental shortcuts (biases) 
Table 8. HE precursors 
 
 
Fig. 3. An example of the preceding posters (Title : Reconfirmation of communication by 
habit) 
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Fig. 4. An example of the developed posters (Title : Unexpected equipment condition) 
6. Discussion 
In this chapter, we introduce various human factors activities for reducing human errors in 
NPPs. Previous human factors activities were focused on regulation according to nuclear 
power laws. But these activities are going to expand an enterprise management as 
mentioned section 4-5 in recent years. The HFMP is an example of representative human 
factors activity in fragments. These management programs are necessary for complex 
systems, because many jobs interfered. That is, NPPs need integrated management systems 
with the parts working in coordination. 
Several technologies and assessments, as mentioned section 5, are developed, and the others 
are going to improve still methods for preventing and reducing human errors. New 
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methods for reducing human errors have to identify and verify application effectiveness in 
on-site. These can help to offer methods to be considered for reducing human error in NPPs 
as well as other fields of industry. 
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